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California Charging Orders: Court
Ordered Foreclosures Of Charged
Partnership Interests

I. INTRODUCTION

A charging order is the procedural device currently used by a
court to reach the partnership interest of a judgment debtor where
the judgment is against the partner individually, not against the
firm.1 The charging order gives the judgment creditor the right to
collect the profits, surplus, and any other monies which have come
due to the debtor partner up to the unsatisfied amount of the
creditor's judgment including interest.2 California Corporations

1. See CAL. CoRP. CODE § 15028(1) (West 1991). California Corporations Code section
15028 provides:
(1) On due application to a competent court by any judgment creditor of a partner,
the court which entered the judgment, order, or decree, or any other court, may charge the
interest of the debtor partner with payment of the unsatisfied amount of such judgment
debt with interest thereon; and may then or later appoint a receiver of his share of the
profits, and of any other money due or to fall due to him in respect of the partnership, and
make all other orders, directions, accounts, and inquiries which the debtor partner might
have made, or which the circumstances of the case may require.
(2) The interest charged may be redeemed at any time before foreclosure, or in case
of a sale being directed by the court may be purchased without thereby causing
dissolution:
(a) With separate property, by one or more of the partners, or
(b) With partnership property, by any one or more of the partners with the
consent of all the partners whose interests are not so charged or sold.
(3) Nothing in this act shall be held to deprive a partner of his right, if any, under

the exemption laws, as regards his interest in the partnership.
Id.; see also ADVisING CALroRmA PRTNrmaws 2d § 6.88 (Continuing Education of the Bar 1988)
(stating that the charging order is the procedure by which the judgment creditor may reach the debtor
partner's interest in the partnership).
2.
CAL. CoRP. CODE. § 15028(1). See supra note 1 (containing the text of California
Corporations Code section 15028(1)); see also, Comment, Commentary On The New MarylandRules
Of Civil Procedure (Part2 of2), 43 MD. L. REV. 669, 862 (1984) (explaining that a charging order
is analogous to garnishment in that the judgment creditor may seek and obtain an order compelling
the partnership to pay over to the creditor the debtor's income stream as well as any capital
distributions which would have been made to the debtor).
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Code section 15028, adopted by statute in 1949 along with the rest
of the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA), 3 defines the requirements
for obtaining a charging order.4 However, section 15028 does not
clearly describe the procedural requirements or the implications of
obtaining a charging order beyond stating that an order may be

obtained "on due application." 5
In practice, serving a notice of motion for a charging order
upon the judgment debtor, and on the other partners or the
partnership, creates a lien on the judgment debtor's interest in the
partnership. 6 If the requested charging order is issued by the court,
the lien created continues until satisfaction of the terms of the
charging order.7 Alternatively, if the motion for a charging order
is denied, then the lien is extinguished.'
Assuming the charging order is issued, express authority for a
court-ordered foreclosure and sale of the charged partnership

3. UNIw. PARTNERsmH ACT § 1-43,6 U.L.A. 9-544 (1969) (codified as amended at California
Corporations Code §§ 15001-15045 (West 1991)).
4. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 15028; supra note 1 (containing the text of California
Corporations Code § 15028(1) (West 1991)).
5. See CAL CORP. CODE § 15028(1) (West 1991). But see ADVS= CALIoRNIA
PARTNERSHIPS 2d §§ 6.89-6.90 (Continuing Education of the Bar 1988) (stating that the appropriate
procedure for obtaining a charging order includes the filing of a memorandum of points and
authorities with cites to specified authority); ScHwARTZ & AHART, CALIFORNIA PRACnCE GUIDE,
EIFoRciNo JuDoMEmrs AND DEBTS Forms 6:YY.1, 6:YY.2, 6:7. (1992) (containing the following
forms: a notice of motion to charge partner's interest; a declaration in support of motion to charge
partner's interest; and an example of the format in which the court should issue an order charging
a partnership interest).
6. See CAL CODE Crv. PROc. § 708.320 (West 1987); see also id. § 416.40 (West 1987)
(pertaining to service on partnership); UNiF. PARTNERSHP ACT § 5,6 U.L.A. 20, Notes of Decisions
5 (1969) (citing to Dillard v. McKnight, 34 Cal. 2d 209,215,209 P.2d 387, 392 (1949) which held
that a judgment entered against partner after service of process on less than all of them will not be
given effect of personal judgment against partners not actually served, and that service of process on
one partner is not service on all partners); ALAN BROMBERG & LARRY RIBSTEIN, BROMBERO AND
RiBsTmN ON PARTNltsImP 3:72-73 (1988) [hereinafter BROMBERO & RmSTEIN] (noting that the
charging order and any ancillary orders should be made only upon giving full notice and opportunity
to be heard to both debtor and nondebtor partners because of possible adverse impact).
7. CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 708.320(b) (West 1987).
8. Id.; see BROMBERG & RIBsTEIN, supra note 6, at 3:71. The lien on the partner's interest
in the firm does not confer priority on the charging creditor over a partnership creditor. Id. This is
consistent with the priority under the UPA of partnership creditors over creditors of individual
partners with respect to partnership property. Ld.at 3:71 n.96 (citing Uniform Pamtership Act §§
36(4) at 436 and 40(h) at 469 (1969)).
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interest is not provided by statute in California.9 Nevertheless, the
First and Third California Appellate Districts have recently found
section 15028 to imply that courts have the power to order the
foreclosure and sale of a charged partnership interest."0 However,
the First and Third California Appellate Districts are in conflict as
to the proper standard for determining whether a court should use
its equitable powers to authorize foreclosure and sale of a debtor
partner's partnership interest through the charging order
11
procedure.
In Centurion Corporation v. Crocker National Bank,12 the
First District Court of Appeal concluded that a court may authorize
the sale of a debtor partner's partnership interest if: (1) A charging
order has been obtained; (2) the judgment nevertheless remains
unsatisfied; and (3) all of the non-debtor partners have consented
to the sale. 13 In contrast, the Third District Court of Appeal, in
Hellman v. Anderson," held that if foreclosure and sale of the
partnership interest would not unduly interfere with the partnership
business, consent of the non-debtor partners is not required."5
This split of authority has occurred due to the lack of guidance
given in section 15028 regarding whether foreclosure is actually
9.
See CAL. CoRP. CoDE § 15028 (West 1991); supra note 1 (containing the text of section
15028 of the California Corporations Code); see also BROMBERO & RBsrEN, supra note 6, at 3:72
(stating that foreclosure would seem to be within the broad judicial power under the last clause of
section 28(1) of the Uniform Partnership Act); CAL. Corn. CODE § 15026 (West 1991) (defining
"partnership interest" as personal property amounting to a partner's share of the profits and surplus
arising from the partnership).
10. See Hellman v. Anderson, 233 Cal. App. 3d 840, 850,284 Cal. Rptr. 830, 836 (3rd Dist.
1991) (holding that a court may order foreclosure of a charged partnership interest if foreclosure
would not unduly interfere with the partnership business); Centurion Corp. v. Crocker Nat'l Bank,
208 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7, 255 Cal. Rptr. 794, 797 (1st Dist. 1989) (holding that a court may order a
partnership interest sold where a charging order has first been obtained, the judgment nevertheless
remains unsatisfied, and the non-debtor partners consent to the court ordered sale); see also infra
notes 139-170 and accompanying text (discussing the Crocker decision); notes 172-213 and
accompanying text (discussing the Helman decision).
11. See infra notes 139-170 and accompanying text (discussing the Crockerdecision); notes
172-213 and accompanying text (discussing the Hellman decision).
12. 208 Cal. App. 3d 1,255 Cal. Rptr. 794 (1989).
13. Crocker, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 7, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 797; see infra notes 139-70 and
accompanying text (discussing the Crocker decision).
14. 233 Cal. App. 3d 840, 284 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1991).
15. Heilman, 233 Cal. App. 3d at 852, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 838; see infra notes 171-212 and
accompanying text (discussing the Heilman decision).
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authorized, and what standard should be used in determining
whether to grant foreclosure in a given case.16 Foreclosure and
sale of a partnership interest divests the debtor partner of all
economic rights while leaving the debtor partner's management
rights undisturbed. 7 The potential conflicts created by such a
situation, including the protection of the interests of the non-debtor
partners, the judgment creditors and the economy generally, have
created disagreement as to the proper standard for determining
whether a court should order a charged partnership interest
foreclosed and sold.
Part I of this Comment sets forth the creditors' rights in
California, prior to the adoption of the UPA, to reach a partnership
interest through direct execution. on partnership property where the
8
debt is against an individual partner and not against the firm.1
Part I also addresses the policy concerns driving the drafting and
adoption of the UPA 19 , and the rights of creditors in California
subsequent to the adoption of the UPA.2 Part II examines the
Crocker and Hellman decisions which found, and began to define,
an implied statutory power for the courts to authorize foreclosure
and sale of a partnership interest.2 ' Part II concludes that the
undue interference test, as outlined in Hellman, is the proper test
for the equitable order of foreclosure and sale of a charged
partnership interest, and suggests several factors which may be
useful in guiding a court's analysis of this issue.'

16. See CAL. CoRp. CODE § 15028(1) (West 1991) (stating that procedural requirements for
obtaining a charging order include **due application" without granting express authority for
foreclosure and court ordered sale); see also L Gordon Gose, The ChargingOrderUnder The UPA,

28 WAsm L REV. 1,5 (1953) [hereinafter Gose] (discussing charging orders under the UPA).
17. Hellman, 233 Cal. App. 3d at 852, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 838; see infra notes 171-212 and
accompanying text (discussing the Hellman decision); see also Bromberg & Ribstein, supra note 6,
at 3:72 (stating that after the charge and the entry of other orders, the debtor continues to be a partner
in all respects except distributions and withdrawals from the firm).
18. See infra notes 23-46 and accompanying text.
19. See infia notes 47-79 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 80-134 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 135-212 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 213-239 and accompanying text.
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I. BACKGROUND
Prior to the adoption of the UPA, the judgment creditor of an
individual partner could execute directly on partnership property
resulting in the dissolution of the partnership.' This result was
perceived as causing an injustice to the non-debtor partners by
forcing the complete disruption of the partnership business.'
A. DirectExecution On PartnershipPropertyIn CaliforniaPrior
To The Adoption of The UPA
As early as 1859, the California Supreme Court considered the
argument that specific partnership property should not be subject
to direct levy and sale on an execution by a judgment creditor of
one of the individual partners.? In Jones v. Thompson,26 Jones
and Thompson were partners in a business which owned cattle,
sheep and horses.' Jones sought an injunction to prevent the
sheriff from selling the property owned by the partnership, which
had been levied upon for the settlement of a judgment against
Thompson in his individual capacity.28 Jones conceded that the
interest of a partner in a firm could be attached and sold by the
sheriff for the benefit of the debtor partner's separate creditors.29
Jones argued, however, that claims of creditors of an individual
partner are subordinated to partnership creditors, entitling
partnership creditors to a preference in the distribution of
partnership property.3" Jones sought an injunction in order to
obtain an accounting and dissolution of the partnership prior to the

23. See JUDSON CRANE & ALAN BROMBERO, CRANE AND BROMBERO ON PARTNERSHIP § 43,
at 240 (1968) [hereinafter CRANE & BRoMBERO] (stating that at common law, a creditor of a
partnership could subject his share in partnership property to attachment or execution); see also Jones
v. Thompson, 12 Cal. 191, 199 (1859) (stating that the interest of a partner in partnership property
could be sold for the partner's separate debts).
24. Gose, supra note 16, at 2.
25.

See Jones v. Thompson, 12 Cal. 191, 198-99 (1859).

26. 12 Cal. 191 (1859).
27. Jones, 12 Cal. at 192.
28. Id. at 192-93.
29. Id. at 197.
30. Id.
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sheriff's sale to insure satisfaction of a debt the partnership owed
to Jones himself.3 1
Two main arguments were offered by Thompson to support the
direct levy and execution of his partner's interest in partnership
property.32 First, Thompson noted that a partner has a legal
interest in possession of specific property, thus creating a leviable
estate.33 Second, if execution was not permitted, a debtor could
become judgment proof merely by entering into a partnership.34
The Jones court held that the interest of a partner in partnership
property was a legal estate in chattels, and as such, could be sold
for the partner's separate debts.35 However, the court concluded
that the sheriff could only seize and sell the interest that the debtor
partner held. 36 The Jones court defined a partnership interest as
a partner's share of the residuum of property left after the
settlement of the firm's debts.37 It was this residuary interest
which would pass to the purchaser at the sheriff's sale.38
The Jones court determined that if either the judgment debtor
was indebted to the firm, or the firm was indebted to such an
extent that the debtor partner would have no interest in any of the

common property upon dissolution and winding up, then it would
be appropriate to enjoin the
Jones, however, the value
considerably in excess of
circumstance, the court found

sheriffs sale of the property.39 In
of the partnership property was
the partnership debts.4" In that
that enjoining the sheriff's sale was

31.

Id. at 196-97.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 195.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 199.
Id.
Id.
Id.

39.

Id. In such a case, the debtor partner's creditor's claims were subordinated to the

partnership's creditors. Id. If there are many purchasers of the partnership property at the sheriffs
sale, it would become extremely difficult for the non-debtor partners to pursue their rights in the
property. Id. According to the Jones court, to prevent a multiplicity of lawsuits, and to preserve the
non-debtor partners' liens on partnership property, enjoining the sale may be proper. Id.
40. Id. at 199-200.
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improper.41 The Jones court ordered sold only so much of the
partnership property as was necessary to pay the firm debts, and
ordered the balance of the property divided, thus compelling
dissolution of the partnership.42
The Jones decision illustrates the state of the law in California
prior to the adoption of the UPA.43 Direct execution against
partnership property was permissible where a creditor had a
judgment against a partner in his individual capacity.' Under the
Jones rule, direct execution against partnership property caused
dissolution and winding up of the partnership.4 5 As a result, the
partnership business was completely disrupted.4
B. Policy Concerns Driving The Drafting and Adoption of The
UPA
The procedure outlined in the Jones decision for converting a
partnership interest into money to satisfy a judgment held by a
creditor of an individual partner produced harsh results.' These
results were vividly described by Lord Justice Lindley" of the
English Court of Appeal as follows:
When a creditor obtained a judgment against one partner
and he wanted to obtain the benefit of that judgment agaist
the share of that partner in the firm, the first thing was to

41.

Id. at 200.

42.

Id.

43.

See, eg., Wright v. Ward, 65 Cal. 525,527 (1884); Commercial Bank Y. Mitchell, 58 Cal.

42, 49 (1881); Robinson v. Tevis, 38 Cal. 611, 615 (1869); cf. CAL. CoRP. CODE § 15028 (West
1991); supra note 1 (containing the text of California Corporations Code section 15028 defining
charging orders); CAL. CORP. CODE § 15025(2)(c) (West 1991) providing in relevant part: "(c) A
partner's right in specific partnership property is not subject to enforcement of a money judgment,
except on a claim against the partnership." Id.
44. Jones, 12 Cal. at 200.
45. Id.
,46. See Gose, supra note 16, at2.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 1 (describing Lord Justice Lindley as an eminent authority on the law of

partnership).
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issue a fi. fa.,49 and the sheriff went down to the
partnership place of business, seized everything, stopped the

business, drove the solvent partners wild, and caused the
execution creditor to bring an action in Chancery in order
to get an injunction to take an account and pay over that

which was due by the execution debtor. A more clumsy
method of proceeding could hardly have grown up.-"
The clumsy direct execution procedure described above had the
unfortunate effect of completely disrupting the partnership business,
and forcing the fin to dissolve.51 This same effect occurred
throughout the majority of the United States prior to the adoption
of the UPA.5" The procedure for reaching a partnership interest
prior to the adoption of the UPA was not only harmful to the
debtor and non-debtor partners of the firm, but damaged the
interests of the judgment creditor, and other creditors of the
53
fIn.
The disastrous results of the direct execution procedure
described above indicated an obvious need for change.5 4 The

49. See Centurion Corp. v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 208 Cal. App. 3d 1,6 n.4, 225 Cal. Rptr. 794,
796 n.4 (1989) (defiming 'A fa."). "FL Fa." is the abbreviation for "'fieri facias," or "that you
cause to be made,*" the term used to describe a writ of execution commanding the sheriff to levy and
make the amount of a judgment from the goods and chattels of the judgment debtor. Id.
50. Gose, supra note 16, at I (citing Brown, Janson & Co. v. Hutchinson & Co., 1 Q.B. 737
(1895) (Undley, L.J.)).
51. Gose, supra note 16 at 2.
52. See id.at 1 (summarizing the general execution statutes prevailing throughout the United
States as normally consisting of: (1) Seizure of some or all of the partnership property under a writ
of execution; (2) sale of the debtor partner's "interest in the property"; (3) acquisition of the debtor
partner's interest "in the property" by the purchaser at the execution sale, subject, however, to the
payment of partnership debts and prior claims to the firm against the debtor partner, (4) compulsory
dissolution and winding up of the partnership; and (5) distribution to the execution purchaser of the
debtor partner's share of any property remaining after the winding up process was completed); see
also Jones v. Thompson, 12 Cal. 192, 200 (1859); supra notes 23-46 and accompanying text
(discussing California law allowing direct execution of partnership property in order to satisfy the
judgment of a partner's individual creditors).
53. Gose, supra note 16, at 2 (stating that the procedure was not only unfair to the non-debtor
partners, but was also harmful to the partnership interest which the creditor sought to reach because
the good will and going concern value might be impaired or destroyed due to the forced liquidation

of assets alone, rather than the sale of the enterprise as a whole).
54. See id. at 2-3.
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UPA, adopted in forty three states including California, 55
eliminated the direct execution procedure, 6 and with it, many of
the procedure's harsh results. 7
C. The Uniform PartnershipAct
In 1902, the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws began drafting the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA). 8 One of
the central goals of the drafters was to clarify the great confusion
of theory and practice which existed with regard to the rights of a
partner, and
the partner's separate creditors, in partnership
59
property.
The UPA changed the legal incidents of a partner's ownership
rights." Prior to the adoption of the UPA, partners held
partnership property as joint tenants. 1 The UPA changed the
55. CAL. CORP. CODE Partnerships tit. 2, table of jurisdictions wherein act has been adopted
(West 1991).

56. See UNIw. PARiNERSH ACt § 25(2)(c), 6 U.L.A. 326 (1969) (stating that a partner's right
in specific partnership property is not subject to enforcement of a money judgment, except on a claim
against the partnership).
57. Gose, supra note 16, at 5.
58. See UNip. PARTERsHIP ACT §§ 1-45,6 U.L.A. 5 commissioners' prefectory note (1969);
see generallyGose, supra note 16 (stating that the UPA was promulgated in 1914, and first adopted
in Pennsylvania in 1915); UPA Revision Subcommittee of the Committee on Partnerships and
Unincorporated Business Organizations, Should the Unijform PartnershipAct Be Revised, 43 Bus.

LAw. 121 (1987) (stating that the UPA has been adopted in every state but Louisiana); William
Draper Lewis, The Uniform PartnershipAct, 24 YAtE lJ. 617 (1915) (outlining the history of the
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the body responsible for drafting the UPA);
H. S. Richards, The Uniform PartnershipAct, 1 Wisc. L REV. 5 (1920) (stating that the Commission
on Uniform State Laws was organized in 1892 for the purpose of suggesting uniform legislation to
the various states).
59. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT commissioners' prefectory notes, 6 U.L.A. 5 (1969); see Donald
Weidner, The Existence of State and Tax Partnerships:A Primer, 11 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 17
(1983) (stating that the basic policy judgment of the drafters of the UPA was that particular pieces
of partnership property, and, hence, potentially, the very business of the partnership, should not be
jeopardized by every claim of separate creditors); see also CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 23, at
240 (stating that no partnership property question has been more confused than the right of a
partner's separate creditors to attach or levy execution on the partner's interest in the firm's property).
60. See UNIV. PAr'rtNrsrp ACr § 25,6 UL.A. 326 (1969). UPA section 25 was codified in
California as California Corporations Code section 15025. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15025 (West 1991).
61.

UNsp. PARTNERSH

AcT § 25,6 U.LA. 327 Official Comment (1969) (stating that the

early courts declared that partners were joint tenants of partnership property). UPA section 25 was
codified in California as California Corporations Code section 15025. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15025
(West 1991).
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status of partnership property holdings by creating a new tenancy
called a tenancy in partnership.62 The new tenancy in partnership
served to separate the tangible incidents of a partner's property
rights from the intangible interest in the partnership entity.'
Under the UPA, a partner has rights in specific partnership
property, an interest in the partnership, and the right to participate
in management." A partner has a right to possess partnership
property for partnership purposes.65 However, there is no inherent
right, as an incident to the tenancy in partnership, to possess
partnership property for non-partnership purposes without the
consent of the other partners.' A partner's interest in the
partnership is defined as the partner's right to a share of the profits
of the enterprise, and the surplus capital remaining after dissolution
and winding up of the firm. 67

62. UNit. PARTNERHmp AcT § 25(1), 6 U.L.A. 326 (1969). A partner is a co-owner with the
other partners of specific partnership property holding as a tenant in partnership. Id. UPA section 25
was codified in California as California Corporations Code section 15025. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15025
(West 1991).
63. Gose, supra note 16, at 2; see Donald Weidner, A Perspective To ReconsiderPartnership
Law, 16 FLA. ST. U. L REv. 1, 10-11 (stating that the incidents of the tenancy in partnership make
clear that the partnership is treated as an independent, almost tangible entity, that stands firmly
between its assets and the partners). The UPA provides that the interest of the partner is not in the
underlying partnership assets, but in the partnership entity, an interest in the share of the profits and
surplus. Id.; see also UNwm. PARTERSHIP ACr § 24,6 U.LA. 324 (1969) (declaring that the property
rights of a partner are: (1) His rights in specific partnership property; (2) his interest in the
partnership; and (3) his right to participate in management).
64. UNit. PART ERsHP ACT § 24, 6 UL.A. 324 (1969). UPA section 24 was codified in
California as California Corporations Code section 15024. CA. CORP. CODE § 15024 (West 1991).
65. UNip. PARTNEmsImp ACT § 25(2)(a), 6 U.LA. 326 (1969). A partner has an equal right
with the other partners to possess specific partnership property for partnership purposes; but a partner
has no right to possess such property for any other purpose without the consent of the other partners.
Id. UPA section 25 was codified in California as California Corporations Code section 15025. CAL
CORP. CODE § 15025 (West 1991).
66. Urar. PARTNm HP Aer § 25(2)(a), 6 U..A. 326 (1969). A partner does not have the
right to possess partnership property for non-partnership purposes without the consent of the other
partners. Id. UPA section 25 was codified in California as California Corporations Code section
15025. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15025 (West 1991); see also Weidner, supra note 63, at 51 (stating that
no partnership has any interest in specific partnership assets for the partner's own personal purposes;
the partner can convey no such interest for personal purposes, nor can the partner's personal creditors
force such a conveyance). A partner's interest in the partnership is that partner's share of the profits
and surplus, and it is against that interest that the partner's separate creditors may seek a charging
order. Id.
67. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 26, 6 U.LA. 349 (1969). UPA section 26 was codified in
California as California Corporations Code section 15026. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15026 (West 1991).

190

1992 / California Charging Orders
In relation to the charging order procedure, the tenancy in
partnership functions to eliminate the ability of a creditor to 'hold
up' the partnership business or exercise powers which the debtor
partner does not possess. 8 A tenancy in partnership is
distinguishable from a joint tenancy in that, unlike a joint tenancy,
a partner's rights to specific property are not assignable without the
consent of the other partners.69 The ability to assign the right to
use partnership property for partnership purposes would, in effect,
make the assignee a partner of the other partners.70 Since a
partnership is a purely voluntary relationship, an uninvited partner
cannot be thrust upon the others without their consent.71 If a
partner cannot assign partnership property for personal purposes, it
follows that a partner's separate judgment creditor has no right to
levy on that property.72
Although the tenancy in partnership prevented the separate
creditors of a partner from executing directly upon partnership
assets, the drafters of the UPA did not leave creditors without a
remedy." Section 28 of the UPA specifically provides for the
charging of the debtor partner's partnership interest with the
payment of the unsatisfied amount of a judgment against the
74
partner.

68.

See Lewis, supra note 58, at 634 (stating that section 25 of the UPA declares that a

partner's right in specific partnership property is not assignable for purposes unrelated to the
partnership, and, since a partner cannot assign partnership property for his own purpose, it follows
that his separate creditors have no right to levy on such property).
69. See UNiP. PARNEarSHm Acr § 25(2)(b), 6 U.L.A. 326 (1969) (stating that a partner's right
in specific partnership property is not assignable except in connection with the assignment of the
rights of all the partners in the same property).
70.

Id. § 25, 6 U.L.A. 328, Official Comment.

71.
72.
73.

Id.
Lewis, supra note 58, at 634.
See UNIF. PARThERms
Acr § 25(2)(c), 6 U.L.A. 326 (1969). A partner's right in specific

partnership property is not subject to attachment or execution, except on a claim against the
partnership. Id.; see also Baum v. Baum, 51 Cal. 2d 610, 612-13, 335 P.2d 481,483 (1959) (stating

that charging orders on partnership interests have replaced levies of execution as the remedy for
reaching such interests).
74. UNwe.PARTNERSHIP Acr § 28, 6 U.LA. 358 (1969).
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Section 28 of the UPA was adopted as section 15028 of the
California Corporations Code. 5 Under section 15028, courts have
the power to appoint a receiver for the debtor partner's share of the
profits, and any other money due the partner. 76 Courts are also
given broad power to make any other orders, directions, accounts,
and inquiries which the debtor partner might have made, or which

the circumstances of the case may require.' The effect of a
charging order is to impress a lien on the debtor's charged
partnership interest. 7' Although section 15028 specifically
provides the non-debtor partners with a right to redeem a charged
partnership interest prior to foreclosure79 and, in the case of a
court directed sale, provides non-debtor partners with a right to
purchase the debtor partner's partnership interest without causing

a dissolution of the partnership, courts are not provided with the
express power to order foreclosure and sale of the partner's
charged interest in California Corporations Code section 15028, or

any other provision of the California Corporations Code.

75. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 15028 historical and statutory notes (West 1991). Section 15028
of the California Corporations Code is identical to section 28 of the UPA. Id.
76. Id.; see BROMBEO AND Rwsmn, supra note 6, at 3:72 (stating that the receiver is
entitled to the judicial relief needed to conserve partnership property for payment to the creditors, but
that the receiver does not participate in management).
77. CAi. CoRp. CODE § 15028 (West 1991); see supra note 1 (providing the text of California
Corporations Code section 15028).
78. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 708.320 (West 1987) providing:
(a) Service of a notice of motion for a charging order on the judgment debtor and
on the other partners or the partnership creates a lien on the judgment debtor's interest in
the partnership.
(b) If a charging order is issued, the lien created pursuant to subdivision (a)
continues under the terms of the order. If issuance of the charging order is denied, the lien
is extinguished.
Id.; see also supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of a charging order on a
partnership interest); Taylor v. S & M Lamp, 190 Cal. App. 2d 700, 711, 12 Cal. Rptr. 323, 330
(1961) (stating that a lien denotes a legal claim or charge on property, either real or personal, as
security for the payment of some debt or obligation and includes every case in which personal or real

property is charged with the payment of a debt).
79. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 15028, supra note I (containing the text of California
Corporations Code section 15028(2)); see also Gose, supra note 16, at 17-18 (arguing that the
redeemed interest should be held in trust for the debtor partner because of the fiduciary relationship
among partners).
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D. The Use of Charging Orders in California
California case law considering charging orders is sparse.
0 and Taylor v. S & M Lamp 1 are
However, Evans v. Galardi"
two cases which considered the statutory charging order procedure
in California. The Evans and Taylor decisions were the two main
cases used to support the holding of Centurion v. Crocker National
Bank.12 The court in Crocker held that a court could order the
foreclosure of a partnership interest when a charging order had first
been obtained, the judgment nevertheless remained unsatisfied, and
the non-debtor partners consent to foreclosure.8 3 An analysis of
the Evans and Taylor decisions reveals that the foundation upon
which Crocker is laid may be a misinterpretation of the Evans and
Taylor holdings."
1. Evans v. Galardi
In Evans v. Galardi,5 a limited partnership owned a motel.8 6
The motel had been levied upon under a writ of execution against
the limited partners to enforce a judgment unrelated to the
partnership.' The limited partnership, El Dorado Improvement
Co. (El Dorado), was composed of three limited partners, the
plaintiff Evans and the defendants, Galardi and Hodge."8 The
general partner was a corporation solely owned by the plaintiff and
defendants. 9
Plaintiff Evans accepted a promissory note from the defendants
in consideration for Evans' agreement to sell to the defendants his

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

16 Cal. 3d 300, 546 P.2d 313, 128 Cal. Rptr. 25 (1976).
190 Cal. App. 2d 700, 12 Cal. Rplr. 323 (1961).
208 Cal. App. 3d 1, 255 Cal. Rptr. 794 (1989).
Id. at 7, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 797.
See infra notes 85-134 and accompanying text (discussing the Evans and Taylor

decisions).
85.
86.
87.
88.

16 Cal. 3d 300, 546 P.2d 313, 128 Cal. Rptr. 25 (1976).
Evans, 16 Cal. 3d at 303-4, 546 P.2d at 316, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 28.
Id
Id. at 303, 546 P.2d at 316, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 28. El Dorado developed, owned and

managed a motel.
89. Id.

Id.
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entire interest in the limited partnership, and all of his stock in the
corporate general partner."° A written contract was entered into by
the parties in their individual capacities. 9 Execution of this
transaction entitled Galardi and Hodge, as limited partners, to 100
percent of the net profits of El Dorado.92
After making several payments on the note, Galardi and Hedge
defaulted.93 Evans brought an action against the defendants in
their individual capacities, and judgment was entered in Evans'
favor. 94 Evans then obtained a writ of execution for satisfaction
of the judgment.95 The court instructed the sheriff to levy upon
the motel and to collect the receipts of the business until the

judgment was satisfied.9 El Dorado filed a third party claim to
the property and business receipts, alleging that it was the sole
owner of the motel and its receipts, and that Galardi and Hodge, as
limited partners, had no interest upon which the writ of execution
could properly be levied to enforce Evans' judgment.' El Dorado
contended that Evans could reach Galardi's and Hodge's limited
partnership interest solely by a charging order.9 No charging
order had been obtained."
Evans argued that since the defendants were entitled to 100
percent of the net profits of the business in their capacities as
limited partners, they actually owned the entire equitable and
beneficial interest in El Dorado's assets.'00 In this situation,
Evans argued that an exception to the statutory prohibition against

90.

Id.

91. Id. The parties did not enter into the contract in their capacities as either limited partners
or as shareholders in the corporate general partner. Id. El Dorado was not a party to, and did not sign,
the agreement or the promissory note. Id. Under the contract, Galardi and Hodge became the sole
owners of the corporate general partner. Id at 303-04, 546 P.2d at 316, 128 Cal. Rptr. 28.
92. Id. at 303-304, 546 P.2d at 316, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 28.
93. Id. at 304, 546 P.2d at 316, 128 CA1. Rptr. at 28.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.

97.

Id.

98.

Id.

99.

Id.

100. Id. at 304, 546 P.2d at 316-17, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 29. The corporate general partner's stock
was owned entirely and equally by the two judgment debtors. Id. at 304 n.4, 546 P.2d at 317 n.4,
Cal. Rptr, at 29 n.4.
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execution should be recognized. 1 ' Evans posited that the purpose
of the statutory charging procedure, to protect the rights of nondebtor partners, was not applicable in situations where there were
no non-debtor partners."° The Evans court refused to recognize
such an exception to the statutory charging order procedure. 103
The California Supreme Court in Evans held that a judgment
creditor could not execute and levy directly on partnership assets
to satisfy a partner's personal debt.' °4 Instead, the court required
the statutory charging order procedure to be used. 05 The Evans
court stated that where the partnership is a viable business
101. Id. at 310-1, 546 P.2d at 321, 128 Cal Rptr. at 33-4.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 311, 546 P.2d at 321, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 33. Evans' argument appears compelling.
A firm structured as El Dorado, appears to take advantage of a loop-hole in the law. Otherwise, an
individual may, consistent with limited partnership and corporation law, form a corporation to serve
as a holding company, serve as the sole director, create a limited partnership with the corporation
serving as the sole general partner, and the individual (the sole corporate shareholder) serving as the
sole limited partner. The limited partner is then able to take advantage of the exculpation from
liability incident to the corporate form by having the corporation serve as the sole general partner,
as well as the exculpation of liability incident to the position of a limited partner. See CAL. CORP.
CODE § 15632 (West 1991) (stating that a limited partner is not liable for any obligation of a limited
partnership unless named as a general partner in the certificate or, in addition to the exercise of the
rights and powers of a limited partner, the limited partner participates in the control of the business).
Additionally, the individual is able to reap the benefits of partnership pass-through tax treatment
through the limited partner's right to 100 percent of the net proceeds of the limited partnership. See
Donna Adler, Master Limited Partnerships,40 U. FL.A. L. REv. 755, 763-765 (1988) (stating the test
to determine whether a limited partnership whose sole general partners are corporations will be
treated as an association taxable as a corporation or as a partnership).
104. Evans, 16 Cal. 3d at 310, 546 P.2d at 321, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 33 (citing Baum v. Baum,
51 Cal. 2d 610, 612-13, 335 P.2d 481,483 (1959)). Limited partners have no property interest in the
partnership property by virtue of their status as limited partners. Id. at 307,546 P.2d at 318, 128 Cal.
Rptr. at 31. Thus, such assets are not available to satisfy a judgment against the limited partner in
an individual capacity. Id. at 307, 546 P.2d at 319, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 31.
105. Id. at 310,546 P.2d at 321, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 33 (citing Baum v. Baum, 51 Cal. 2d 610,
612-13, 335 P.2d 481,483 (1959)). The Evans court left open the question of whether an exception
to the charging order procedure would be recognized where, on similar facts, the partnership was not
a bona fide limited partnership, the limited partners used the limited partnership for fraudulent
purposes, or where the general partner could be pierced, transforming the limited partners into a dual
role of being both limited and general partners. Id. at 310, 546 P.2d at 320-21, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 3233. The court noted that even if the defendants should be treated as general partners, rather than
limited partners, this fact alone would not enable the plaintiff to reach the partnership assets. Id. at
310 n.13, 546 P.2d at 320-21 n.13, 128 Cal. Rptr at 32-33 n.13. California Corporations Code section
15025 states that a partner's rights in specific partnership property are not subject to attachment, or
execution, except on a claim against the partnership. CAT. CORP. CODE § 15025 (West 1991). Section
15509 of the California Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act makes the same rule applicable
to general partners in a limited partnership. Id § 15509 (West 1991).
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organization, and the plaintiff does not show that a charging order
or levy of execution against the debtors' personal property will fail
to satisfy the judgment, there is no reason to deviate from the
0° The plaintiff in Evans failed
statutory charging order process."
107
to meet this burden of proof.
Although the court in Evans did not grant an exception in that
case, the opinion suggests a potential exception to the charging
order procedure.! 8 A narrow exception may exist where the
partnership is entirely owned by the judgment debtors, and the
judgment creditor proves that the partnership is not a viable
business organization, providing that the judgment creditor is
unable to secure satisfaction of the judgment by use of a charging
order or by levy or execution against the debtors' other personally
owned property." 9 In such circumstances, all of the partners are
indebted to the judgment creditor, and there are no non-debtor
partners whose rights require protection."'
Evans was interpreted by the First District Court of Appeal in
Centurion Corporationv. Crocker NationalBank" to imply that
courts are authorized to foreclose and sell a partnership interest
where, after a charging order has been issued, the judgment
remains unsatisfied."' Upon close examination, however, it
appears that the Evans court never considered the issue of whether
a partnership interest could be foreclosed upon by the judgment

106. Evans, 16 Cal. 3d at 311, 546 P.2d at 321, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
107.

Id.

108. See id.
(declining plaintiff Evans' solicitation for an exception to the statutory charging
order procedure where the partnership is owned entirely by the judgment debtors, the court held that
"'there was no reason to permit" an exception where: (1) The partnership is a viable business

organization; and, (2) there appears to be no reason why plaintiff will be unable to secure satisfaction
of his judgment by use of a charging order procedure or by levy of execution against the debtors'

other personally owned property).
109. See id. Although the court declined to embrace Evans' suggested exception, the holding
could be read as an opportunity to develop arguments distinguishing the state of facts as presented
in Evans within the constraints of the factors listed in note 107 supra.
110. See id. at 310-11,546 P.2d at 321, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 33 (ElDorado Improvement Co., the
partnership at issue in Evans, was owned in its entirety by the debtor partners).
111. 208 Cal. App. 3d 1, 8, 255 Cal. Rptr. 794, 798 (1989).
112. Centurion Corp. v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 208 Cal. App. 3d 1, 8,255 Cal. Rptr. 794, 798
(1989).

1992 / California Charging Orders
creditor, or ordered sold by the court. 113 In addition, the Crocker
court also looked to the case of Taylor v. S & M Lamp'14 for the
proposition that a court may authorize the sale of a charged
115
partnership interest.
2. Taylor v. S & M Lamp
Taylor v. S & M Lamp"6 involved a general partnership,
Stephen Foundries, which was composed of Ben and Eugene

Stephens, and R. K. Corbin." 7 The plaintiff, Taylor, held a
judgment against Ben and Eugene in their individual capacities. 118
Taylor was not, however, a judgment creditor of the general
partnership."' Taylor obtained a charging order to enforce his
judgment. 120 Without seeking any supplementary court orders
under the statutory charging order procedure,2 1 Taylor obtained
a writ of execution and caused the sheriff to levy on the
122
defendants' beneficial rights and interests in the partnership.
Taylor then purchased these interests at the sheriff's sale.'2' It
was alleged in Taylor that subsequent to the charging order, and
prior to the sheriff's sale, a partnership dissolution agreement wasentered into wherein the defendants purported to transfer all of

113. See Evans, 16 Cal. 3d at 305,546 P.2d at 317, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 29 (stating that the most
important question before the court was whether the defendants, as limited partners, had any interest
in the assets of the limited partnership which would render those assets subject to execution in
satisfaction of a personal judgment against defendants; not whether plaintiff was entitled to
foreclosure of a charged partnership interest); infra notes 156-161 and accompanying text (analyzing
Evans in the context of the Crocker decision).
114. 190 Cal. App. 2d 700, 12 Cal. Rptr. 323, (1961).
115. Crocker, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 8, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 798.
116. 190 Cal. App. 2d 700, 12 Cal. Rptr. 323, (1961).
117. Taylor, 190 Cal. App. 2d at 709, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 709, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 328-29; see CAL. CORP. CODE § 15028 (West 1991)
(discussing the courts power to make all other orders which the circumstances of the case may
require).
122. Taylor, 190 Cal. App. 2d at 709, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
123. Id. at 710, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 329. Taylor immediately took possession of all of the
partnership assets, placed locks on the premises, and notices of ownership on the doors. Id.
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their interests in the firm to Corbin, the defendants' nephew and
partner.12 4 Corbin then allegedly made a fraudulent transfer of all
the partnership assets to another entity, S & M Lamp. 5
At issue in Taylor was whether or not, by virtue of the
execution sale, Taylor obtained rights in the partnership property
sufficient for Taylor to assert a claim against S & M Lamp for
conversion.'26 In order to resolve that issue, 1the
court had to
27
valid.
was
sale
execution
the
determine whether
At trial it was held that the sheriff's execution sale of the
partnership property did not conform to the law because charging
orders on partnership interests had replaced levies and executions
as the means for reaching a partnership interest.1 8 The Taylor
appellate court found that the trial court had correctly stated the
law as applied to the ordinary case where the partnership continues
a bona fide existence, and (1) there is no transfer of partnership
assets without fair and adequate consideration, or (2) in fraud of
creditors of either the partnership or individual partners.'29
According to the Taylor appellate court, however, if dissolution

occurred, or there was a transfer of partnership assets (1) without
fair and adequate consideration, or (2) for the purpose of
defrauding creditors of the partnership or of individual partners, the
ordinary and usual situation, which California Corporations Code
sections 15025 and 15028 are designed to protect, does not
exist.13° The Taylor court reasoned that to apply the general rule

"124. Id at 709-10, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
125. Id. It was alleged that Corbin then immediately purported to transfer the assets of the
former partnership to S & M Lamp, a customer of Stephens Foundries, for $500 and the promise of
employment, the $500 never being paid and the employment contract never commencing. Id.
126. Id. at 704, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
127. Id. at 709, 12 Cal. Rplr. at 328.
128. Id. at 710, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 329. The trial court's memorandum of opinion stated:

The charging order of October 24, 1956 impressed a lien on the interests of Ben and
Eugene Stephens in the partnership, but the proceeding thereafter followed by plaintiff did
not conform to the law, Another order could have been obtained directing the sale of said
interests. A sheriff's sale is not proper in the premises.
Charging orders on partnership interests have replaced levies and execution as the
remedy for reaching such interests.

Id.
129.
130.

Id. at 710, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
Id. at 710-11, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
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requiring a charging order as a shield to such a situation would be
contrary to reason and public policy.131
The Taylor decision supports the proposition that where
dissolution occurs, or there is a fraudulent transfer of specific
partnership assets, then the public policy concerns of protecting
non-debtor partners are no longer present. 132 In these situations,

a charging order may not be required and a direct levy and
execution on specific assets may be made as an exception to the
charging order procedure.133 However, a careful reading of Taylor
suggests that the issue of whether a court is authorized to order a
134
charged partnership interest foreclosed or sold never arose.
Taylor was limited to the issues of whether the sheriff's execution
sale on partnership property was13valid,
and whether a prima facie
5
case for conversion was proven.

131. Id. at 711, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 329. The purpose of the lien of a charging order is to permit
the judgment creditor to realize on his judgment against that partner's interest in the partnership. Id.
at 711,128 Cal. Rptr. at 330. There will be no profits, from which the lienholder may satisfy his lien,
if the partnership assets are transferred to a third person, directly or indirectly, and placed beyond the
reach of the lien, without payment of fair and reasonable consideration to the partnership, or, in the

event of dissolution, to the person charged with winding up the partnership affairs. Id. at 711-12, 128
Cal. Rptr. at 330.
132. Id. at 713, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 331. The Taylor court stated that it could find no reason why,
when a partnership has been dissolved, and the purposes which California Corporations Code §§

15025 and 15028 are designed to protect no longer exist, a judgment creditor of an individual partner
should be prohibited from pursuing the same remedy of levy and sale at execution which is available
to judgment creditors in non-partnership matters. Id.
133. Id. The code sections are not intended to protect a debtor partner against claims of
personal judgment creditors, where no legitimate interest of the partnership or of the remaining or
former partners is to be served. 48 CAL JuR. 3d Partnership§ 174 (1972).

134. See Taylor, 190 Cal. App. 2d at 705, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 326 (stating that the plaintiffs'
second cause of action asserted that defendants were liable for commission of the tort of "a
concealment of [the judgment debtors'] assets for the purpose of defrauding their principal creditor,
the plaintiff). Charging orders were considered by the Taylor appellate court. See also id. at 711-12,
12 Cal. Rptr. at 330 (holding that a transferee of partnership assets, acting with knowledge of the

existence of a charging order, will be liable to the charging order lienholder if the transferee: (1)
Transfers the assets to a third person without a fair and adequate consideration; and, (2) without
payment to the partnership; or, (3) in the event of dissolution, without making payment to the person
effectuating the winding up of the partnership affairs).
135.

Taylor, 190 Cal. App. 2d at 704, 12 Cal. Rprt. at 325.

Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 23
II. COURT ORDERED FOREcLOSURE AND SALE

Until 1989, there were apparently no recorded decisions in
California addressing the issue of whether courts had equitable
powers to foreclose a partnership interest. Recently, the First
District Court of Appeal in Centurion v. Crocker National
Bank,"' 6 and the Third District Court of Appeal in Hellman v.
Anderson,'" considered the issue and held that California courts
do have equitable powers to foreclose a partnership interest.'38
However, the standards delineated in Hellman and Crocker
regarding whether a court should order foreclosure and sale of a
charged partnership interest are in conflict.'3 9
A. Centurion v. Crocker National Bank
The First District Court of Appeal, in Centurion v. Crocker
NationalBank, 40 considered the question of whether the
California Corporations Code authorizes a court to order the sale
of a judgment debtor's interest in a limited partnership.' 4 ' The
Crocker court held that a court may authorize the sale of a debtor
partner's partnership interest, even in the absence of fraud, where
three conditions are met.'42 First, a charging order must
136. 208 Cal. App. 3d 1, 255 Cal. Rptr. 794 (1989).
137. 233 Cal. App. 3d 840, 284 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1991).
138. Crocker,208 Cal. App. 3d at 7,255 Cal. Rptr. at 798; Hellman, 233 Cal. App. 3d at 850,
284 Cal. Rptr. at 836; see infra notes 140-213 (discussing the Crockerand Heiman decisions). But
see BROMBERO & RmSTmEN, supra note 6, at 3:73. The authors note that despite the reference to
foreclosure in section 28(2) of the UPA, there is some authority against a right of foreclosure on a
partnership interest. Id. (citing Buekman v. Goldblatt, 39 Ohio App. 2d 1, 314 N.E.2d 188 (1974),
which states that UPA section 28(2) must refer to foreclosure in support of a judgment against the
partnership, because otherwise it would conflict with UPA section 25(2)(c)). Because of the threat

posed by foreclosure to the continuity of the firm, Georgia has modified its version of UPA section
28 to prohibit foreclosure. Id. at 3:73 n.105; GA. CODE ANN. § 14-8-28 (Michie 1989) (modifying
Georgia's version of UPA section 28 to prohibit foreclosure). See generally Larry Ribstein, An
Analysis of Georgia's New PartnershipLaw, 36 MERCER L. RBv. 443, 490 (1985) (reviewing
Georgia law on foreclosure of a partnership interest).
139. Compare Hellman, 233 Cal. App. 3d at 850-54, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 837-38 with Crocker,
208 CaL App. 3d at 9, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 798.
140. 208 Cal. App. 3d 1, 255 Cal. Rptr. 794 (1989).

141.

Crocker, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 3, 255 Cal. Rplr. at 795.

142.

Id. at 9, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 798.
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previously have been obtained; second, the judgment must have
nevertheless remained unsatisfied; and third, all of the non-debtor
partners must have consented to the sale.143
Crocker involved an appeal from an order for the sale of a
limited partner's interest in a limited partnership.'" Perroton was
a limited partner in Turn Key Storage.145 Crocker National Bank
(Crocker) had been awarded a money judgment against Perroton in
his individual capacity.146 Crocker obtained an order, pursuant to
California Corporations Code section 15673, charging Perroton's
limited partnership interest with the satisfaction of Crocker's
judgment.147 Crocker moved for an order of sale of Perroton's
limited partnership interest after not receiving any monies from the
charging order. 141 The general partner of Turn Key Storage
consented to the sale. 149 After a hearing, Perroton's limited
partnership interest was ordered sold. 151 Perroton appealed,
arguing that the court is not empowered to order the sale of a
partnership interest where the partnership is not the judgment
debtor."

143. Id.
144. Id. at 3, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
145. Id. at 4, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
146. Id. at 3, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 795. Turn Key Storage was not a judgment debtor. Id.
147. Id. at 3-4, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 795. California Corporations Code section 15673 governs
charging orders with respect to limited partnership interests under the California Revised Limited
Partnership Act, comprised of sections 15611 through 15723 of the California Corporations Code.
CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 15611-15723 (West 1991). Section 15673 provides:
On application to a court of competent jurisdiction by any judgment creditor of a partner,
the court may charge the limited partnership interest of the partner with payment of the
unsatisfied amount of the judgment with interest. To the extent so charged, the judgment
creditor has only the rights of an assignee of the limited partnership interest. This chapter
does not deprive any partner of the benefit of any exemption laws applicable to the
partner's limited partnership interest.
Id.
148. Crocker, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 4, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
149. Id. Notice of motion was served on Perroton and the sole general partner of Turn Key
Storage. Id. The general partner filed a statement of conditional non-opposition to the sale. Id. This
statement stipulated that the sale would not be opposed provided that the rights of the purchaser at
the sale were limited to the rights to profits and losses, but that the purchaser would not become a
substituted limited partner in the partnership. Id. at 4 n.1, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 795 n.1.
150. Id. at 4,255 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
151. Id. at 3, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
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The Crocker court began its opinion by stating the established
rule that a partner's interests in specific partnership assets are
exempt from direct execution when the partnership is not a
debtor.152 The court noted that in order to avoid the complete
disruption of the partnership business, a judgment creditor must
seek a charging order to reach the debtor partner's interest in the
partnership, where the judgment is against the partner in the
partner's individual capacity.'53 The court in Crocker then turned
to the language of section 15028 of the California Corporations
Code to support its holding that the court may order the sale of a
charged partnership interest.154 Section 15028 provides:
The interest charged may be redeemed at any time before foreclosure,
or in case of a sale being directed by the court may be purchased

without thereby causing dissolution: (a) With separate property, by any
one or more of the partners, or (b) With partnership property, by any
one or more of the partners with the consent of all the partners whose
interests are not so charged or sold.'" (emphasis added).

152. Id. at 5, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 796. The court cited, interalia, California Corporations Code
section 15025(2)(c) for the proposition that a partner's right in specific partnership property is not
subject to enforcement of a money judgment, except on a claim against the partnership. Id.
153. Id. at 6, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 797.
154. I, at 6-7 n.5, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 797 n.5.
155. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15028 (West 1991). The court did not explain its reliance on section
15028 of the California Corporations Code which governs general partnerships. The interest ordered
sold was a limited partnership interest. Id, at 3, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 795. Therefore, the opportunity to
illuminate some of the similarities, distinctions, and interplay between the limited and general
partnerships statutes with respect to foreclosure of a charged partnership interest presents itself.
California Corporations Code section 15006(2) states that sections 15001 through 15045 govern
limited partnerships as well as general partnerships, so long as there is no inconsistency with relevant
limited partnership statutes. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15006(2) (West 1991). In the event of an

inconsistency, the relevant limited partnership statute would govern. Id. California Corporations Code
section 15522(2), of the California Uniform Limited Partnership Act (section 15501 through 15533),
appears to contemplate foreclosure of a charged limited partnership interest. CAL. CORP. CODE §

15522 (West 1991). Section 15522 provides for a method by which a general partner may redeem
the partnership interest. Id. Section 15522 of the California Uniform Limited Partnership Act
provides:
(1) On due application to a court of competent jurisdiction by any creditor of a
limited partner, a court may charge the interest of the indebted limited partner with
payment of the unsatisfied amount of such claim; and may appoint a receiver, and make
all other orders, directions, and inquiries which the circumstances of the case may require.
(2) The interest may be redeemed with the separate property of any general partner,
but may not be redeemed with the partnership property.

202

1992 / California Charging Orders

From this statutory language, the Crocker court determined that
section 15028 implies that a court has the power to order sale of
the partnership interest. 5 ' The court then turned to Evans v.
Galardi15 7 and Taylor v. S & M Lamp15 for the elements of a
test for determining when this power should be exercised. 59 The
Crocker court read Evans and Taylor to indicate that a court may
authorize sale of a partnership interest where the judgment creditor
has first obtained a charging order, and has demonstrated that the
judgment nevertheless remains unsatisfied."
Upon close
examination, however, it appears that neither Taylor nor Evans
(3) The remedies conferred by paragraph one shall not be deemed exclusive of
others which may exist.
(4) Nothing in this act shall be held to deprive a limited partner of his statutory
exemption.
Id. California Revised Limited Partnership Act [Revised Act] section 15673 of the California
Corporations Code (sections 15611 through 15723) does not expressly provide for a method of
redemption. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15673 (West 1991). Section 15673 of the Revised Act provides:
On application to a court of competent jurisdiction by any judgment creditor of a partner,
the court may charge the limited partnership interest of the partner with payment of the
unsatisfied amount of the judgment with interest. To the extent so charged, the judgment
creditor has only the rights of an assignee of the limited partnership interest. This chapter
does not deprive any partner of the benefit of any exemption laws applicable to the
partner's limited partnership interest.
Id. § 15673 (West 1991). However, in light of California Corporations Code section 15006, the
legislature's silence on provisions for redemption in section 15673 does not make section 15673
inconsistent with section 15028. See id. §§ 15006, 15028, 15673 (West 1991). No inconsistency
exists between section 15028 and section 15673. Thus, according to section 15006, section 15028
would apply to the question of whether a court has the power to order a charged limited partnership
interest to be foreclosed upon and sold, where the limited partnership is governed by the revised act.
See id. § 15006 (West 1991). Where the limited partnership is governed by the California Uniform
Limited Partnership Act, section 15522 provides similar language from which to imply the
legislatures contemplation and approval of foreclosure as contained in California Corporations Code
section 15028. Id. § 15522 (West 1991). The California Uniform Limited Partnership Act governs
limited partnerships already in existence on the effective date of the Revised California limited
Partnership Act, July 1, 1984, unless the limited partnership refiles and elects to be governed by the
Revised Act. Id. §§ 15710, 15711 (West 1991).
156. Crocker, 208 Cal. 3d at 7-8, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 798. The court cited Advising Calitornia
Partnerships6.88, 428-29 (1988) for the interpretation of California Corporations Code section 15028
that the judgment creditor does not own the partnership interest by virtue of the charging order, but
may become the owner by foreclosing the interest. Id. Any of the other partners may, however,
redeem the interest before foreclosure and court ordered sale, using their individual property, or

partnership property if all the partners other than the debtor consent. Id. (emphasis added).
157.
158.
159.
160.

See supra notes 85-114 (discussing the Evans decision).
See supra notes 115-134 (discussing the Taylor decision).
Crocker, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 8, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 798.
Id. at 9, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 798.
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dealt with the issue of whether a court has the power to order
foreclosure and sale of a charged partnership interest, nor did those
decisions define a standard under which such a power is to be
exercised.16 ' Nevertheless, Crocker held that a court may
authorize the sale of a debtor partner's partnership interest, even in
the absence of fraud, where a charging order has first been
obtained, the judgment nevertheless remains unsatisfied, and all of
the non-debtor partnershave consented to the sale.6 2

The Crocker court's adoption of a consent requirement arises
without explanation. Since the Crocker opinion did not indicate the
foundation for the consent requirement, 63 it is only possible to
hypothesize as to its derivation.
California Corporations Code section 15028(2)(b) requires all
of the partners whose interests are not charged to consent to the
redemption or purchase of the charged partnership interest when
the payment is to be made with partnership property.'" Although

161. See supra notes 85-114 and accompanying text (discussing the Evansdecision); notes 115134 and accompanying text (discussing the Taylor decision).
162. Crocker, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 7,255 Cal. Rptr. at 797.
163. See id. at 4 n.1, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 795 n.1 (providing the text of the general partner's
statement of conditional non-opposition to the court ordered sale of the judgment debtor's partnership
interest); id. at 7, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 797 (concluding, without explanation, that the court has the
authority to order a sale of the judgment debtor partner's partnership interest where the creditor
shows it was unable to obtain satisfaction of the debt under a charging order, and where the
remaining partner(s) have consented to the sale); Id. at 9, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 798 (imposing a nondebtor partner consent requirement without explanation as to the requirements derivation).
164. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15028(2)(b) (West 1991); see supra note I (providing the text of
section 15028). Provisions for redemption or purchase are not included in the Revised Act at section
15673. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 15673 (West 1991); supra note 146 (containing the text of California
Corporations Code section 15673). Thus, section 15028 of the California Corporations Code becomes
applicable in accordance with section 15006. See supra, note 154 (stating that California Corporations
Code section 15006 provides that the UPA will govern limited partnerships when not inconsistent
with relevant limited partnership statutes). As for the California Uniform Limited Partnership Act,
section 15522(2) prohibits redemption with partnership property. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 15522
(West 1991); supra note 154 (providing the text of California Corporations Code section 15522).
However, the purchase of a partnership interest at a court ordered sale is also not mentioned in
section 15522. See supra note 154 (providing the text of California Corporations Code section
15522). Thus, section 15028 could be used to fill this gap. It is possible to argue that a general
partner's ability to redeem the debtor partner's partnership interest is only curtailed by the express
prohibition of the use of partnership property as consideration for redemption. However, partnership
property could arguably be used with the consent of the non-debtor general partners, at a purchase
at a court ordered sale. See supra note 154 (providing the text of California Corporations Code
section 15522). There is arguably no inconsistency between section 15522(2) and section 15028(2)(b)
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consent of the non-debtor partners is required by the statute for the
redemption or purchase of the debtor partner's interest with
partnership property, there is no indication in the Corporations
Code that consent is the standard to be used for determining
whether such sale should be authorized." s In fact, the very power
to authorize foreclosure and sale itself must be implied from the
statute." s Inferring a consent requirement as part of the standard
for determining whether courts may authorize foreclosure and sale
seems far attenuated from the express language of the statute.167
The only other portion of the Crocker court's opinion which
might explain the origin of the consent requirement is the fact that
the sole general partner of Turn Key Storage filed a statement of
conditional non-opposition to the sale of Perroton's limited
partnership interest."' This statement confirmed that there would
be no objection to the sale so long as the successor's rights in the
partnership were restricted to profits and losses without becoming
a substituted limited partner in the partnership.1 69 Since the non-

of the California Corporations Code on this point. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 15711 (West 1991)
(providing that the California Uniform Limited Partnership Act governs limited partnerships already
in existence on the effective date of the Revised California Limited partnership Act, July 1, 1984,
unless the limited partnership refiles and elects to be governed by the Revised Act).
165. See CAL. CoRP. CODE §§ 15028(2)(b) (West 1991); supra note 1 (containing the text of
California Corporations Code section 15028(2)(b)).
166. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 15028(2)(b) (West 1991); supra note 1 (containing the text of
California Corporations Code section 15028(2)(b)).
167. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 15028(2)(b) (West 1991); supra note 1 (containing the text of
California Corporations Code section 15028(2)(b)). Although California Corporations Code section
15028 provides reason to infer court power to order foreclosure and sale of a charged partnership
interest, section 15028 does not appear to provide any reason for inferring a consent requirement into
the equation. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 15028 (West 1991).
168. Centurion Corp. v. Crocker Nat Bank, 208 Cal. App. 3d 1, 4 n.1, 255 Cal. Rptr. 795,
794 n.1 (Ist Dist. CL 1989). The statement of conditional non-opposition provided:
The partnership does not object to the sale of Ion Perroton's partnership interest at
Sheriffs sale as sought by Crocker Bank provided that the rights of the purchaser at such
sale are limited as set forth in the Stipulation and Order and amendment to Certificate of
Limited Partnership as described above; to wit, the sueccessor [sic] would have the rights
to profits and losses but would not become a substituted limited partner in the partnership.
Id.
169. Id.
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debtor partner had effectively consented to the sale, the issue of
consent was never litigated in Crocker.7 '
Despite the lack of explanation for the consent requirement, the
Crocker test remains that in order to obtain an order for the sale of
a debtor partner's partnership interest, even in the absence of fraud,
the creditor must have previously obtained a charging order, the
judgment must nevertheless remain unsatisfied,
and all of the non171
sale.
the
to
consent
must
debtor partners
B. Hellman v. Anderson
In Hellman v. Anderson,172 the Third District Court of Appeal
considered whether court-ordered foreclosure and sale of a charged
partnership interest is statutorily authorized. 173 The court in
Hellman held that upon a motion to foreclose and sell a charged
partnership interest, the trial court should exercise its equitable
powers to order foreclosure if such order will not cause undue
interference with the partnership business. 74 In
He llm a n,
Anderson was a partner in the general partnership of Rancho
Murieta Investors (RMD.' 7 Hellman had instituted an action
against Anderson, in his individual capacity, for breach of fiduciary
duty and fraud. 176 Hellman sought an accounting, breach of
contract, breacl of fiduciary duty, mandatory injunction, rescission,
and fraud."7 The lawsuit was settled but Anderson failed to make

any of the payments required by the settlement agreement. 78 A
stipulated judgment was subsequently entered against Anderson for
more than $440,000.179 After several unsuccessful attempts to

170. Id. at 4,255 Cal. Rptr. at 795; see Hellman v. Anderson, 233 Cal. App. 3d 840, 850-51,
284 Cal. Rptr. 830, 837 (3rd Dist. Ct. 1991) (disagreeing with the consent requirement arguably
established by the Crocker case).
171. Crocker, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 9, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 798.
172. 233 Cal. App. 3d 840, 284 Cal. Rptr. 830 (3rd Dist. Ct. 1991).
173. Heilman, 233 Cal. App. 3d at 844-51, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 832-37.
174. Id. at 852, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
175. Id. at 842, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
176. Id. at 842-43, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
177. Id. at 843, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 832.

178.

Id.

179.

Id.
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enforce the judgment, Hellman obtained a charging order against
Anderson's partnership interest in RMI. i ° However, Hellman
received no money under the charging order.'' Hellman obtained
an order authorizing and directing the foreclosure and sale of
Anderson's charged partnership interest.l' z The trial court
authorized the foreclosure sale based on the unlikelihood that the
judgment would be satisfied within a reasonable time by the
83
charging order.1

On appeal, the court first considered the question of whether
foreclosure and sale of a charged partnership interest is statutorily
authorized.'" The Hellman court began its discussion by
distinguishing between the partner's right in specific partnership
property, and the partnership interest subject to a charging order
and foreclosure sale."9 5 Although specific partnership property is
not subject to enforcement of a money judgment for a partner's
individual judgment debts, 86 a partner's right to profits and
surplus of the firm is subject to the enforcement of monetary
17
judgments through the statutory charging order procedure.

180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 844, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 844-851, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 832-37.
185. Id. at 846-47, 284 Cal. Rptr. 830, 834 (citing California Corporations Code section
15025(2)(c)). The court stated the rule that a partner's right in specific partnership property is not
subject to enforcement of a money judgment, except on a claim against the partnership. Id. (citing
California Corporations Code section 15024). California Corporations Code section 15024 states that
the property rights of a partner are: (1) His rights in specific partnership property; (2) his interest in
the partnership; and (3) his right to participate in the management. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15024 (West
1991). The court also relied on California Corporations Code section 15026 which provides that a
partner's interest in the partnership is his share of the profits and surplus, and the same is personal
property. Heilman, 233 Cal. App. 3d at 846,284 Cal. Rptr. at 834; CAL. CoRp. CoDE § 15026 (West
1991).
186. See Hellman, 233 Cal. App. 3d at 846, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 834 (citing California
Corporations Codes section 15025(2)(c) which states that a partner's right in specific partnership
property is not subject to enforcement of a money judgment, except on a claim against the

partnership).
187. Id. at 847, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 834 (citing California Code of Civil Procedure section
708.310 for the rule that if a money judgment is rendered against a partner but not against the
partnership, the judgment debtor's interest in the partnership may be applied toward the satisfaction
of the judgment by an order charging the judgment debtor's interest pursuant to California
Corporations Code § 15028 (general partnership) or § 15673 [limited partnership)).
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The Hellman court held that court-ordered foreclosure and sale
of a charged partnership interest is statutorily authorized."18
Relying on section 15028 of the Corporations Code, which
authorizes a charging order on the debtor partner's partnership
interest, the court in Hellman recognized that a trial court has the
power to make any orders which the circumstances of a case may
require.'89 This broad base of authority, combined with the
provision in section 15028(2) stating that a charged partnership
interest may be redeemed prior to foreclosure or purchased at a
court-directed sale by the non-debtor partners, convinced the
Hellman court to hold that the statute implied judicial authority to
order foreclosure and sale of the charged partnership interest."9
The court in Hellman also noted that foreclosure sales of charged
partnership interests are implicitly recognized in section 15032.'91
Section 15032(2) provides that the purchaser of a partner's interest
under section 15028 may apply for court-ordered dissolution of the
192
partnership.
In support of its statutory analysis, the Hellman court noted the
elementary canon of statutory construction that significance should
be ascribed to every word and phrase of a statute, and that a
construction making some words surplusage should be avoided.1 93
The Hellman court stated that there would be no reason for
Corporations Code section 15028 to define rules regarding
redemption prior to foreclosure and sale unless foreclosure and sale
were contemplated. 94 If foreclosure and sale were not statutorily
authorized, section 15028(2) and section 15032(2) would be

188. Id. at 850, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
189. Id. at 847, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
190. Id. at 850, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
191. Id. at 847, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
192. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15032(2) (West 1991). Section 15032(2) provides for court decree
of dissolution:
(2) On the application of the purchaser of a partner's interest under Sections 15027 and
15028:

(a) After the termination of the specified term or particular undertaking,
(b) At any time if the partnership was a partnership at will when the interest

was assigned or when the charging order was issued.
Ild.
193.

HeUman, 233 Cal. App. 3d at 847,284 Cal. Rptr. at 834 (citing People v. Woodhead, 43

Cal. 3d 1002, 1010,741 P.2d 154, 157,239 Cal. Rptr. 656, 659 (1987)).
194. Id. at 847, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 834-35.
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complete surplusage.' 95 According to the Hellman court, there
would be no way to give meaning to those sections unless the
Corporations Code is read as authorizing the foreclosure and sale
of a charged partnership interest.196
The Hellman court next turned to the question of what standard
must be met before a court should exercise its equitable powers to
order the foreclosure and sale of a charged partnership interest. 97
Anderson, the judgment debtor, argued that Crocker requires that
the non-debtor partners must consent to the foreclosure, and he
further argued that the trial court had erred in deciding that the
consent requirement in Crocker was mere dictum. 8 Thus, the
Hellman court was compelled to address the issue of whether
consent should be a prerequisite to the exercise of equitable powers
to cause foreclosure and sale, or whether some other standard
should be imposed.'"
The Hellman court disagreed with the Crocker court's consent
requirement. 2" The Hellman court's argument against the consent
requirement was that neither the California Corporations Code
section 15028, nor any other section, indicates that non-debtor
partner consent is required for foreclosure on a charging order.2"'
The Hellman court stated that when the drafters of a statute have
employed a term in one place and omitted it in another, that term
should not be inferred where it has been excluded. 202 Section
15028(2)(b) expressly requires the consent of non-debtor partners
before partnership property may be used to redeem the charged
interest, clearly indicating legislative awareness of the consent
issue.2 3 Further, according to the Hellman court, if the legislature
195. See id. (stating that the court is unable to imagine why the statute would give advice about
redemption prior to foreclosure and sale unless foreclosure and sale were contemplated).
196. Id.
197.

Id. at 850-53, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 837-39.

198. Id. at 851,284 Cal. Rptr. at 837. Anderson's partner in RMI intervened to oppose the trial
court's foreclosure order. Id. at 843, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
199. Id. at 850-53, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 837-39.
200. Id. at 851, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
201. Id.
202. Id. (citing People v. Woodhead, 43 Cal. 3d 1002,1010,741 P.2d 154,157,239 Cal. Rptr.
656, 659-60 (1987)).
203. Id.; see supra note I (providing the text of California Corporations Code section 15028).
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wanted to make partner consent a condition, it knew how to do
so.' Thus, the very statutory provision authorizing foreclosure

expressly requires consent of non-debtor partners in connection
with redemption, but is silent on the question of whether
foreclosure is authorized at all, and is also silent on the question of
whether non-debtor partner consent is required in connection with
foreclosure. "°
Therefore, the court in Hellman held that upon a motion to
foreclose and sell a charged partnership interest, the trial court
should exercise its equitable powers to order foreclosure if that
order will not cause undue interference with the partnership
business.2' The Hellman court noted that the foreclosure and sale
of the partnership interest will not always unduly interfere with the
partnership business to the extent of requiring consent of the nondebtor partners. 2 7 The Hellman holding may be interpreted as
stating that where the foreclosure and sale of the partnership
interest is proven likely to unduly interfere with the partnership
business, however, consent of the non-debtor partners will be
20 8
required.

The Hellman court's holding that an undue interference test is
the standard for determining whether foreclosure and sale should
be ordered is consistent with the reasons stated in Taylor for the
rule against direct executions on partnership property.t 9 The
Taylor court stated that Corporations Code sections 15025(2)(c)
and 15028 were adopted to prevent the hold-up of the partnership
business, and the consequent injustices inflicted upon the nondebtor partners resulting from direct execution on partnership
property."10 It is arguably true that the prevention of

204.

Heilman, 233 Cal. App. 3d at 851, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 837.

205. Id.
206. Id. at 852, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
207. Id.
208. See id. at 852, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 838 (stating that foreclosure and sale of the partnership
interest will not always unduly interfere with the partnership business to the extent of requiring
consent of the nondebtor partners).
209. See id. at 845-46, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 833 (citing Crocker which cites Taylor for the

proposition that charging orders have replaced direct execution of partnership assets in order to
prevent the 'hold up' of the partnership business and the consequential injustices done to the nondebtor partners).
210.
1961).

210

Taylor v. S & M Lamp, 190 Cal. App. 2d 700,708, 12 Cal.Rptr. 323, 328 (Ist Dist. Ct.
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consequential injustices is synonymous with the prevention of
undue interference. The direct execution procedure causes a
complete disruption of the partnership business and forced
dissolution.2" This complete disruption of the partnership
business is the consequential injustice which the UPA
eliminated.212 Reading the Hellman decision in light of Taylor
indicates that the Hellman court's use of the term "undue
interference" appears to represent an attempt to carry out the
intention of the drafters of the UPA to avoid the consequential
injustices of the direct execution procedure.213
MII. A WORKABLE TEST FOR FORECLOSURE AND COURT
ORDERED SALE OF PARTNERSHIP INTEREST

Foreclosure of a partnership interest permanently transfers the
debtor partner's rights to the profits and surplus to the purchaser of
the charged interest.214 However, the debtor partner's right to
manage the firm, to contractually bind the firm, and, consequently,
to potentially cause the non-debtor partners to incur personal
liability remains.2 5 The purchaser of the foreclosed partnership

211. See supra notes 23-57 and accompanying text (discussing the direct execution procedure
for reaching a debtor partner's partnership interest prior to the adoption of the UPA).
212. Heilman, 233 Cal. App. 3d at 845-46, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
213. See Taylor, 190 Cal. App. 2d at 708, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 328; Hellman, 233 Cal. App. 3d at
845-46, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 833 (stating, in both Heilman and Taylor that it was the 'hold up' of the
partnership business and the consequent injustices done to the other partners resulting from execution
against the partnership property that California Corporations Code section 15028 was designed to
prevent).
214. See supra note 1 (providing the text of California Corporations Code section 15028). The
principal change in the creditor's status as a result of the foreclosure and sale is that the creditor now
owns the partner's entire financial interest in the partnership, including all amounts ultimately due
the debtor partner on dissolution after settlement of liabilities. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note
6, at 3:74.
215. See CANE AND BROMBERO, supranote 23, § 43, at 248-49 (stating that while the charge
is in effect, the partner presumably continues to be a partner in all respects except distributions and
withdrawals from the firm); CAL. CORP. CODE § 15024 (separating the partnership interest from the
partner's right to possess specific partnership property and the right to management). California
Corporations Code section 15015 provides:
All partners are liable
(a) Jointly and severally for everything chargeable to the partnership under Sections
15013 and 15014.
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interest does not acquire management rights or rights of access to
the specific partnership property.216
The continued right to manage the partnership and to utilize
partnership property for partnership purposes without an interest in
the partnership profits presents a very strange situation. There is
apparently no authority discussing this anomalous affect. There is
an obvious danger that the extinguishment of the debtor partner's
interest in the firm's profits, combined with a continued right to
manage and bind the firm, may tempt the debtor partner to act in
ways contrary to the interests of the owner of the partnership
interest.217 However, recognition of court authority to order
foreclosure and sale of a charged partnership interest, governed by
an undue interference test, appears to conform with the intentions
of the drafters of the UPA, with California Corporations Code
sections 15028 and 15032, and is supported by public policy
concerns.

2 18

Support for the proposition that the drafters of the UPA
intended to create an undue interference test can be found in Dr.
William Draper Lewis's article commenting on the newly adopted
(b) Jointly for all other debts and obligations of the partnership; but any partner may
enter into a separate obligation to perform a partnershipcontat.
CAI. CoRP. COD § 15015 (West 1991).
216. See BROMBERO & RmSTEN, supra note 6, at 3:72 (stating that while the charge is in
effect, the partner presumably continues to be a partner in all respects except distributions and
withdrawals from the firm); id. at 3:73 (stating that at foreclosure sale, only the partner's interest, not
specific assets of the partnership, is sold); id. at 3:74 (stating that the only way the creditor can
effectively obtain anything on account of the debtor partner's interest will be to exercise the power

to seek judicial dissolution under UPA § 32(2)); see CAL. CORP. CODE

§ 15032(2) (West 1991)

(providing the purchaser of a partner's interest under sections 15027 and 15028 with a right to a
court-ordered decree of partnership dissolution where the partnership is either at will, or the specified
term of the partnership has terminated). Note that in the event that the partnership agreement specifies
a term of partnership existence which is very long, the purchaser of a partnership interest apparently
will be unable to compel dissolution. See Id.
217. However, it should be noted that California Corporations Code section 15028(1) authorizes
the court to appoint a receiver for the charged partnership interest. CAL. CoRP. CODE § 15028(l)
(West 1991). It is unclear from the express language of section 15028 whether the purchaser of a
charged partnership interest would be entitled to the appointment of a receiver, or whether this right
is limited to the context of a charging order. Id.; see BRoNmERo & RmSTErN, supra note 6, § 3.05,
at 3:72 (stating that although the receiver is appointed only for the charged partnership interest, as
distinguished from the partnership or its property, the receiver is entitled to the judicial relief needed
to conserve partnership property for payment to the creditors).
218. 48 CAL. JuR. 3d Partnership § 174 (1972). The purpose of California Corporations Code
section 15028 is to prevent interference with the partnership business and the consequent injustice
done the other partners resulting from execution against partnership property by a creditor of an
individual partner. Id.
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UPA. 19 Referring to the Act's adoption of charging orders as the
new remedy for enforcing judgments against partnership interests
where the firm is not the debtor, Dr. Lewis explained in broad
terms the test the court should apply in making all other orders
which the situation may require:
After the adoption of the Act, when a judgment is secured against

a partner by his separate creditor, all that the creditor will have to do is
to apply to the court which gave him the judgment, or any other court,
to issue an order on the other partners to pay him the profits which

would be otherwise paid to his debtor, or to make any further order
which will result in his securing the payment of his judgment without
unduly interfering with the rights of the remaining partners in
partnershippropertyY20

The ability to foreclose and order a charged partnership interest
sold reduces creditors' concerns that partnerships can be employed
as debtors' havens.22 ' At the same time, the availability of
obtaining foreclosure and sale of a partnership interest may provide
creditors with leverage to force non-debtor partners to choose
between the potential disruption of the firm's business, or assisting
the debtor partner in satisfying the judgment by purchasing the
debtor partner's interest at a court-ordered sale or redeeming the
interest prior to foreclosure.m
Although a strict consent requirement might provide a just
result in some situations, it seems likely that in many cases the

219. Lewis, supra note 58, at 634.
220. Id. (emphasis added).
221. See supra note 26-34 and accompanying text (discussing Jones v. Thompson, 12 Cal. 192
(1859), which considered the potential inequity created by protecting judgment debtor partners'
interests in partnerships).
222. See CRANE & BROMBERO, supra note 23, § 43 at 248-49 (noting that while the purchaser

upon foreclosure acquires the right to dissolve the firm if it is one at will, the other partners are
authorized to redeem the charged partnership interest prior to foreclosure if they are uncomfortable
with the purchasers' power). See supra note 215 (discussing the right, under California Corporations
Code section 15028, of a purchaser of a charged partnership interest to cause dissolution by court
decree). The creditor's major purpose in obtaining a charging order may be to induce the other

partners to persuade the debtor partner to pay the judgment to avoid the risk of foreclosure. John
Hargrove, The Charging Order:Helpful Tools For Creditor'sCounsel, 51 CA.. ST. BJ. 394, 395
(1976).
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non-debtor partners might withhold consent in an attempt to
frustrate the interests of the judgment creditor. An undue
interference test is probably the most reasonable and workable
standard by which a court should determine whether to employ its
equitable powers to order foreclosure and sale of a partnership
2s
interest.
An undue interference test would permit courts to decide, under
a flexible standard, whether ordering foreclosure and sale will yield
a just result.' In contrast, a bright line rule such as the consent
requirement defined by Crocker, does not account for the
distinctions in the myriad factual situations to which a bright line
test would be applied.' The Hellman decision left open the
factors which a court should consider in deciding whether
foreclosure and sale will cause undue interference with the
partnership business.2 6 Fortunately, this lapse will allow the
undue interference test to take shape over time and evolve into a
workable and predictable standard.

A. Defining Undue Interference
What constitutes undue interference is not entirely clear. By the
terms of California Corporations Code section 15028(1), courts are
authorized to use their broad equitable powers 7 in deciding on
the appropriateness of ordering particular actions regarding charged
partnership interests.22' Thus, a court should consider whether the
facts of a given case are such that, in fairness to the debtor
partner's individual creditor, the non-debtor partners, and the
creditors of the firm, foreclosure and court-directed sale of the

223. See CRANE & BROMBERO, supra note 23, § 43 at 248-49 (stating that because the
foreclosing creditor threatens the continuity of the firm, foreclosure should be decreed only as a last
resort, that is, if the charged interest is not likely to pay off the debt within a reasonable time).
224. See Hellman v. Anderson, 233 Cal. App. 3d 840, 852, 284 Cal. Rptr. 830, 838 (3rd Dist.
CL 1991) (stating that the effect of foreclosure on the partnership should be evaluated on a case by
case basis).
225. See supra notes 139-170 and accompanying test (discussing the Crocker decision).
226. See supra notes 171-212 and accompanying text (discussing the Heilman decision).
227. See DAN DOBBs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.1 at 24 (1973) (stating that
cases are sometimes referred to as equitable in the loose sense that it involves questions of discretion,
or judgment, or calls for principles of justice and conscience rather than rigid "legal" rules).
228. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 15028(I), supra note I (providing that a court may make all other
orders, directions, accounts, and inquiries which the circumstances of the case may require).
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partnership interest should be ordered. 9 The Hellman court
offered some guidance in defining a test for undue interference
when it suggested that where the debtor partner has essential
managerial skills, and foreclosure of the debtor partner's
partnership interest would be likely to cause the debtor partner to
abandon the partnership, then undue interference would be
established. °
However, this test alone would seem to impose too lax a
standard on the non-debtor partners. The Hellman court allocated
the burden of proving undue interference to the non-debtor partners
in the ordinary case, because knowledge about, and evidence of,
the effect of foreclosure upon the partnership is particularly known
to the partners.? The non-debtor partners are in a position of
superior access to knowledge. Thus, the court must be particularly
careful to guard against the danger that the partners may, in some
situations, fabricate evidence. Such fabricated evidence will be
difficult for the proponent of foreclosure to refute, considering the
proponent's inherent lack of access to objective knowledge of the
working relationships among the partners. 3 2 The threat of
fabrication of evidence suggests that the undue interference test
should require the opponents of foreclosure to bear the burden of
proving undue interference in objective, concrete, and identifiable
terms. Pragmatically, where the judgment against the debtor partner
is very large, and the charging order is unlikely to satisfy the
judgment for several years, the same abandonment and
consequential undue interference might be caused by virtue of the
charging order itself, even absent foreclosure and sale. A judgment
debtor whose partnership interest has been charged with the

229. See Helhnan v Anderson, 233 Cal. App. 3d 840, 852, 284 Cal. Rptr. 830, 838 (3rd Dist.
Ct. 1991) (stating that a court should consider whether foreclosure of a partnership interest is
appropriate based on the facts of each individual case).
230. Id. at 852, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 838.

231. Id. at 853, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 838-39.
232.

See id. at 853, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 839 (stating that in determining whether the normal

allocation of the burden of proof should be altered, the courts consider a number of factors: The
knowledge of the parties concerning the particular fact, the availability of the evidence to the parties,

the most desirable result in terms of public policy and the absence of proof of the particular fact, and
the probability of the existence or nonexistence of the fact).

215

payment of a sum far exceeding the present value of the debtor
partner's interest in future revenues is likely to lose interest in
exerting effort toward the future success of the partnership
business. The debtor partner would be likely to abandon the
partnership. 3 Moreover, an injustice to creditors would result if
the non-debtor partners were unwilling to devote nonessential or
easily replaceable liquid assets, which do not compose a majority
of the firm's assets, to satisfaction of the creditor's judgment in
order to preserve the existence of the firm and avoid personal
liability. In this situation, the non-debtor partners could collusively
decide to show that foreclosure would cause undue interference
even though such interference is preventable by non-oppressive and
readily available means.
The optimal undue interference test should satisfy the interests
of creditors, the interests of society in promoting a stable economy,
and the interests of non-debtor partners?' Creditors should not
be completely frustrated in satisfying their judgments by a test
which creates a virtual debtors' haven in partnerships. 5 Nondebtor partners should have some protection from the 'hold up'
situation which resulted from the pre-UPA direct execution
236
procedure.
A test serving the interests of creditors, non-debtor partners,
and the economy generally might take the following form. The
creditor should have the initial burden of proving that the debtor
partner's partnership interest has been properly charged, the debtor
partner's other personal assets are either out of the creditor's reach
or insufficient to satisfy the judgment, and that the judgment is

233. This raises the question ofwhether an undue interference test should be used to determine
whether a court should order a partnership interest charged in the first place. Commentators have not
yet addressed the issue of what test should govern the decision to grant ajudgment creditor's motions
to charge a partnership interest.
234. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text (discussing the argument raised by
Thompson in the Jones decision as to the inherent unfairness which would result if partnerships were
permitted to serve as debtor havens); notes 47-57 and accompanying text (discussing the policy of

protecting non-debtor partners from the direct execution procedures existing prior to the adoption of
the UPA).
235. See supra note 26-42 and accompanying text (discussing the Jones decision which raised
the issue of the inequalities which would be present if a debtor partner's partnership interest were
unavailable to the debtor partner's judgment debtors).
236. See supra notes 23-46 and accompanying text (discussing the state of the law prior to
California's adoption of the UPA).
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unlikely to be satisfied within a reasonable time by virtue of the
charging order. 237 Once the creditor has satisfied the court that
these conditions have been met, the court should, unless the nondebtor partners object, order the charged partnership interest
foreclosed upon and sold. 8 Where the non-debtor partners object
to a court-ordered foreclosure and sale, the burden should fall on
the non-debtor partners to persuade the court that foreclosure and
sale will unduly interfere with the partnership's business, or that
the non-debtor partners will personally suffer consequential
injustices.2 9
In making the ultimate decision on whether to order foreclosure
and sale of a partnership interest, the court should consider such
factors as whether a debtor partner with essential managerial skills
is likely to abandon the partnership, whether such abandonment is
likely to cause the firm to be unable to fulfill its contractual
obligations, and whether a breach of the firm's contractual
obligations will result in judgments enforceable against the nondebtor partners personally. The court should weigh these factors
against the size of the judgment, in relation to the partnership's
ability to convert firm asset* into cash in order to satisfy the
creditor's claim by purchasing or redeeming the debtor partner's
partnership interest.2 4°

237. See Heilman v. Anderson, 233 Cal. App. 3d 840, 853, 284 Cal. Rptr. 830, 839 (3rd Dist.

CL 1991) (citing California Evidence Code section 500 which provides "except as otherwise
provided by law, a party has the burden of proof as to each fact the existence or nonexistence of

which is essential to the claim for relief or defense that he is asserting.").
238. See id. at 852, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 838 (stating that the foreclosure and sale of the
partnership interest will not always unduly interfere with the partnership business to the extent of
requiring consent of the non-debtor partners).
239. See id. at 853, 233 Cal. App. 3d at 838-39 (citing California Evidence Code section 500
law revision committee comment (West 1966), stating that the court should determine whether to
alter the normal allocation of the burden of proof by considering the knowledge of the parties
concerning the particular act, the availability of the evidence to the parties, the most desirable result
in terms of public policy, and the absence of proof of the particular fact and probability of the
existence of the fact).
240. See Gose, supra note 16, at 16 (stating that the apparent situations in which sale would

be necessary are those in which, owing to the size of the claim or the absence of current liquid
income, an order to pay over the debtor partner's share of current income and other moneies would
not be effective).
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IV. CONCLUSION

Although the evolution of the law with respect to charging
orders in California has been slow, the law has not been
stagnant."4 The different holdings in Hellman and Crocker

exemplify the room left in the California Corporations Code for
diverse argument and interpretation. 242
The Crocker court's holding that a court may order foreclosure
of a partnership interest where a charging order has first been

obtained, the judgment nevertheless remains unsatisfied, and the
non-debtor partners consent to foreclosure 3 was partially refuted
by the second appellate district court in Hellman.244 Heliman held
that courts have broad equitable powers to decide whether
foreclosure and sale should be ordered through consideration of the
facts of each case. 4 The Hellman court also held that the
particular facts in each case will tend to illuminate whether such an

241. See, e.g., Hellman v. Anderson, 233 Cal. App. 3d 840,284 Cal. Rptr. 839 (3rd Dist. CL
1991) (holding that upon a motion to foreclose and sell a charged partnerhip interest, the trial court
should exercise its equitable powers to order foreclosure if such order will not cause undue
interference witht he partnership business); Centurion Corp. v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 208 Cal. App.
3d 1,255 CaL Rptr. 794 (1st Dist. Ct. 1989) (holding that a court may authorize the sale of a debtor
partner's partnership interest, even in the absence of fraud, where a charging order has previously
been obtained, the judgment remains unsatisfied, and all of the non.debotr partners consent to the
sale); Evans v. Galardi, 16 Cal. 3d 300, 546 P.2d 313, 128 Cal. Rptr. 25 (1976) (holding that where
the partnership is a viable business organization, and the plaintiff does not show that a charging order
or levy of execution against the debtors' personal property will fail to satisfy the judgment, the
statutory charging order procedure is required); Taylor v. S & M Larnp, 190 Cal. App. 2d 700, 12
Cal.Rptr. 323 (1st Dist. CL 1961) (holding that a charging order may not be required, and direct
execution against specific partnership assets may be appropriate where: (1) Dissolution has already
occurred; or (2) there has been a fraudulent transfer of the partnership assets); Baum v. Baum, 51
Cal. 2d 610,335 P.2d 481 (1959) (holding that charging orders on partnership interests have replaced
levies of execution as the remedy for reaching such interests); Ribero v. Callaway, 87 Cal. App. 2d
135, 196 P.2d 109 (1st DisL CL 1948) (suggesting in dictum that a charged partnership interest may
be sold).
242. See supra notes 139-170 and accompanying text (discussing the Crockerdecision); notes
172-212 (discussing the Hellman decision).
243. See Centurion Corp. v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 208 Cal. App. 3d 1, 255 Cal. Rptr. 794
(1989).
244. See Hellman v. Anderson, 233 Cal. App. 3d 840,851,284 Cal. Rptr. 830, 837 (3rd Dist.
CL 1991); supranotes 199-204 and accompanying text (discussing the Heilman court's disagreement
with the Crocker court's consent requirement).
245. See Heitman, 233 Cal. App. 3d at 852, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 838; supra note 205 and
accompanying text (discussing the equitable power of a court to order foreclosure).
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order would unduly interfere with the partnership business.246
Hellman held that unless undue interference could be shown, nondebtor
partner
consent to foreclosure should not be invariably
2 47
rt
4
required.
The Hellman court's broad holding has opened the door for
further debate regarding what undue interference actually means,
as well as establishing a workable framework by which motions to
foreclose and sell a charged partnership interest should be analyzed.
The interests of the partnership's creditors, the non-debtor partners,
the holder of the charging order, and the economy in general are
all within the purveiw of a court's consideration as to whether to
exercise its equitable powers to order a charged partnership interest
foreclosed and sold. Careful and reasoned development of
appropriate factors and analysis will culminate in the evolution of
a more powerful tool with which to enforce judgment debts: the
charging order.
Andrew Ian Sriro

246. See Heilman, 233 Cal. App. 3d at 852, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 838; supra note 206 and
accompanying text (discussing whether a particular order will result in undue interference of a
partnership business).
247.

See Heilman, 233 Cal. App. at 852, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 838; supra note 207 and

accompanying text (stating that unless foreclosure and sale of the partnership interest is proven likely
to unduly interfere with the partnership business, consent of the non-debtor partners will not be

required).
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